A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
提出了一个更易处理的双边匹配市场模型，允许复杂异质性偏好，通过供需平衡阈值求解稳定匹配，并证明连续模型下稳定匹配的唯一性和连续参数变化。
Abstract. We propose a new model of two-sided matching markets, which allows for complex heterogeneous preferences, but is more tractable than the standard model, yielding rich comparative statics and new results on large matching markets. We simplify the standard Gale and Shapley (1962) model in two ways. First, following Aumann (1964) we consider a setting where a finite number of agents on one side (colleges or firms) are matched to a continuum mass of agents on the other side (students or workers). Second, we show that, in both the discrete and continuum model, stable matchings have a very simple structure, with colleges accepting students ranked above a threshold, and students demanding their favorite college that will accept them. Moreover, stable matchings may be found by solving for thresholds that balance supply and demand for colleges. We give general conditions under which the continuum model admits a unique stable matching, in contrast to the standard discrete model. This stable matching varies continuously with the parameters of the model, and comparative statics may be derived as in competitive equilibrium theory, through the market clearing equations. Moreover, given a sequence of large discrete