Endogenous Leverage and Advantageous Selection in Credit Markets
研究信息不对称下，企业家用债务融资投资实物资产时，资产价格如何通过内生杠杆放大，并解释信贷市场中的优势选择现象。
I study asset price amplification in an asymmetric information model. Entrepreneurs issue debt to finance investments in a physical asset. They have private information about their success probabilities. For a given debt level, higher asset prices require entrepreneurs to invest more of their own funds. This makes bad entrepreneurs more reluctant to mimic good ones; as a result, good entrepreneurs increase their equilibrium leverage and invest more, and this amplifies the initial asset price increase. This model generates predictions about the credit market that are qualitatively consistent with existing evidence. Received April 24, 2015; editorial decision June 15, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.