The Effect of Changes in Risk Attitude on Strategic Behavior
研究了在保持纯策略偏好不变但改变对彩票偏好时，风险厌恶和风险偏好如何影响博弈中的理性化策略集和均衡集，发现风险厌恶使理性化策略集扩大，风险偏好使其缩小。
We study families of normal-form games with fixed preferences over pure action profiles but varied preferences over lotteries. That is, we subject players' utilities to monotone but nonlinear transformations and examine changes in the rationalizable set and set of equilibria. Among our results: The rationalizable set always grows under concave transformations (risk aversion) and shrinks under convex transformations (risk love). The rationalizable set reaches an upper bound under extreme risk aversion, and lower bound under risk love, and both of these bounds are characterized by elimination processes. For generic two-player games, under extreme risk love or aversion, all Nash equilibria are close to pure and the limiting set of equilibria can be described using preferences over pure action profiles. [web URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA13948/abstract]