The obsolescing bargain model and oil: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1933–1951
基于档案证据研究1951年英伊石油公司国有化事件，扩展了过时讨价还价模型，揭示会计信息和管理控制在谈判中如何暂时增强公司相对于伊朗政府的议价能力。
We employ archival evidence to investigate events culminating in the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, which followed disagreements over profit allocations arising from a previously negotiated concession. The case study expands the traditional obsolescing bargain model (OBM) by accommodating the use and impact of accounting information in negotiation contexts. The analysis reveals that managerial control and the deployment of accounting information by the AIOC temporarily strengthened its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Iranian government leading up to the nationalisation crisis, demonstrating the potential importance of these new dimensions in wider contexts.