Diagnosing Foreclosure due to Exclusive Dealing
评估了1994年芝加哥啤酒市场中排他性分销安排对竞争的影响，通过估计消费者需求和企业行为模型，提供了一个诊断排他性安排是否导致市场封锁的检验方法，结果表明该市场不存在封锁效应。
Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor agrees to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets. This paper evaluates the effect of exclusive distribution arrangements on competition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. A diagnostic test is provided to judge whether exclusive arrangements lead to foreclosure. To implement this test a model of consumer demand and firm behavior is estimated that incorporates industry details and allows for distribution through exclusive and shared channels. The test indicates that foreclosure effects are not present in this market.