CEO Preferences and Acquisitions
研究发现，目标CEO接近65岁退休年龄时，公司被成功收购的概率显著提高，且收购溢价与年轻CEO相当，表明退休年龄CEO在不牺牲溢价的情况下促成交易。
ABSTRACT This paper explores the impact of target CEOs’ retirement preferences on takeovers. Using retirement age as a proxy for CEOs’ private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEOs’ preferences affect merger activity. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Takeover premiums and target announcement returns are similar for retirement‐age and younger CEOs, implying that retirement‐age CEOs increase firm sales without sacrificing premiums. Better corporate governance is associated with more acquisitions of firms led by young CEOs, and with a smaller increase in deals at retirement age.