Experimentation in organizations
研究委托人如何激励团队在风险项目中工作，发现为阻止代理人拖延和搭便车需支付租金，因此委托人会过早停止项目并分配不对称的实验任务，且更倾向用未来合同而非奖金奖励代理人。
We consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal provides incentives to a team of agents to work on a risky project. The project consists of two milestones of unknown feasibility. While working unsuccessfully, the agents' private beliefs regarding the feasibility of the project decline. This learning requires the principal to provide rents to prevent the agents from procrastinating and free‐riding on others' discoveries. To reduce these rents, the principal stops the project inefficiently early and gives identical agents asymmetric experimentation assignments. The principal prefers to reward agents with better future contract terms or task assignments rather than monetary bonuses.