On efficiency of multistage channel with bargaining over wholesale prices
研究了多阶段渠道中谈判定价与领导者-追随者定价两种系统的效率，给出了谈判系统帕累托优于领导者-追随者系统的权力结构条件，并证明随着阶段数增加，谈判系统的渠道效率趋近100%。
Abstract This article considers a multistage channel with deterministic price‐sensitive demand. Two systems for pricing decisions, that is, the bargaining system and the leader‐follower system, are compared. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions on the power structure, under which the solution of the bargaining system Pareto dominates that of the leader‐follower system. Also, under such conditions, we give a tight upper bound of channel efficiency of the bargaining system, which converges to 100% channel efficiency as the number of stages increases to infinity. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 449–459, 2016