Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?
研究了衍生品在破产中的特殊优先地位对企业借贷成本和衍生品交易动机的影响，发现优先权可能将信用风险转移给债权人，仅在提供足够交叉净额结算收益时才有效。
ABSTRACT Derivatives enjoy special status in bankruptcy: they are exempt from the automatic stay and effectively senior to virtually all other claims. We propose a corporate finance model to assess the effect of these exemptions on a firm's cost of borrowing and incentives to engage in derivative transactions. While derivatives are value‐enhancing risk management tools, seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies: it transfers credit risk to debtholders, even though this risk is borne more efficiently in the derivative market. Seniority for derivatives is efficient only if it provides sufficient cross‐netting benefits to derivative counterparties that provide hedging services.