An Analysis of Accounting Frauds and the Timing of Analyst Coverage Decisions and Recommendation Revisions: Evidence from the US
研究了1995-2009年间美国公司会计欺诈的类型，发现分析师更可能对欺诈公司采取停止覆盖而非仅下调推荐的行动，且欺诈严重程度与行动及时性相关。
Abstract This paper provides a comprehensive exploration of the types of accounting fraud committed by firms over the period 1995–2009. Using detailed data from US SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER), we examine the likelihood and timing of analyst coverage decisions and recommendation revisions related to fraud firms versus firms without accounting fraud. We find that analysts have a higher probability of taking the more severe action of dropping coverage rather than only revising down recommendations for firms with any type of accounting fraud and also for specific egregious types of accounting fraud. Through the use of competing hazards models, we also find that accounting frauds and their egregiousness are positively (negatively) associated with the timeliness of the analysts’ action to drop coverage (revise only). Overall, we find that analysts’ actions may be useful in determining the occurrence of accounting fraud prior to the public announcement of the fraud.