Remaking Mortgage Markets by Remaking Mortgages: U.S. Housing Finance after the Crisis
研究了美国金融危机后住房金融的再监管，聚焦于限制过度风险承担和重建抵押债务私人流通的改革，分析了《多德-弗兰克法案》如何通过改变抵押产品与市场支持机构的关系来重塑市场。
This article examines the post- financial crisis reregulation of US housing finance, focusing on reforms to rein in excessive risk taking and reconstitute the private circulation of mortgage debt. We begin by situating current initiatives—namely, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010—in a much longer trajectory of attempts to construct a national market for home mortgages. Following the theorization of the economy of qualities by Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa, we argue that a dominant theme throughout has been creating or fixing mortgage markets by performing work on the commodities—the mortgage products—that circulate in them. In light of this history, we argue that Dodd-Frank’s primary novelty lies in the way it alters relations between those products and market-supporting institutions, laws, and regulations. We conclude that this shapes a new set of contradictions and conflicts between market liquidity and risk taking, on the one hand, and the original concerns with financial safety and soundness, on the other.