Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
研究了银行面临展期风险时的最优透明度政策，发现危机时披露信息能增强稳定，但正常时期有破坏作用，且监管者存在事后隐瞒信息的动机，导致过度不透明增加系统性危机概率。
ABSTRACT We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank‐specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis.