What Does Debt Relief Do for Development? Evidence from India's Bailout for Rural Households
利用印度历史上最大规模的家庭债务减免计划作为自然实验，研究发现债务减免显著改善了家庭资产负债表，但并未促进储蓄、消费和投资，反而导致非正规借贷增加、投资减少和农业生产力下降，且受益者对未来违约的声誉后果担忧减少，符合道德风险理论。
This paper studies the impact of debt relief, using a natural experiment arising from India's “Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme,” one of the largest household-level debt relief initiatives in history. I find that debt relief has a substantial impact on household balance sheets, but does not affect savings, consumption and investment, as predicted by theories of debt overhang or balance sheet distress. Instead, debt relief leads to greater reliance on informal credit, reduced investment, and lower agricultural productivity. Consistent with moral hazard generated by the bailout, beneficiaries are significantly less concerned about the reputational consequences of future default.