TARGET FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE AND TAKEOVER PRICING
研究发现，在美国收购样本中，目标公司财务独立性越强，收购溢价越高，收购方公告回报越低，这支持了财务独立性增强目标公司议价能力的观点。
Abstract In a large sample of U.S. takeovers, we find that acquisitions of targets with greater financial independence are associated with higher takeover premiums and lower acquirer announcement returns. This empirical result is most consistent with targets' deriving bargaining power from their financial independence. Raising external funds is costly. Targets that do not depend on external funds do not need new external capital and have no reason to acquiesce potential takeover premium to acquirers that can provide capital. Therefore, more financially independent targets should be in stronger bargaining positions vis‐à‐vis potential acquirers, leading to the effect on takeover pricing that we observe.