Optimization and its discontents in regulatory design: Bank regulation as an example
本文对比了经济学视角的优化规范与管理学视角的可靠性规范，指出前者可能导致过度追求决策简单和成本最小化，忽视复杂判断和学习，并用此对比分析银行监管改革讨论。
Abstract Economists and lawyers trained in economics tend to speak about regulation from a perspective organized around the basic norm of optimization. In contrast, an important managerial literature espouses a perspective organized around the basic norm of reliability. The perspectives are not logically inconsistent, but the economist's view sometimes leads in practice to a preoccupation with decisional simplicity and cost minimization at the expense of complex judgment and learning. Drawing on a literature often ignored by economists and lawyers, I elaborate the contrast between the optimization and reliability perspectives. I then show how the contrast illuminates current discussions of the reform of bank regulation.