社会民主主义的紧缩:议程动态与议题所有权的条件性作用

Social democratic austerity: the conditional role of agenda dynamics and issue ownership

Journal of European Public Policy · 2016
被引 65
ABS 3

中文导读

研究左翼政党为何推行财政紧缩,发现选民认为右翼更擅长平衡预算,迫使左翼政府为弥补财政声誉而削减支出和赤字,导致党派差异消失。基于21个OECD国家1980-2006年数据验证。

Abstract

Over the past 30 years, left-wing parties have increasingly abandoned the interests of their core constituency to embark on a right-wing journey of fiscal austerity. I argue that the changing partisan pattern in fiscal policy can in part be explained by analysing social democrats’ need to signal fiscal competence. Drawing on issue ownership theory, my starting point is that voters perceive the Right as better able to balance the budgets than the Left. This leads left-wing incumbents to compensate for their bad fiscal reputation when concerns about balanced budgets are salient in the political system. They do so by reducing spending and budget deficits as much or even more than right-wing governments. In this way, an asymmetric fiscal reputation makes partisan differences in fiscal policy disappear. Support for my claims is found estimating a set of error correction models with data from 21 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries between 1980 and 2006.

财政政策政党政治议题所有权宏观经济政治经济学