INTERMEDIATED CORRUPTION
研究了中介在腐败中的作用，发现诚实的中介能获得更高溢价，腐败交易频率与收入水平负相关，政府提高利润抽取比例会加剧中介活动，增加审计频率可能提高许可证均衡价格。
I model the role of intermediaries in corruption and examine the effects of policy on the level of intermediated corruption, price of permits, and welfare. Intermediaries with a history of being honest earn higher premiums. The frequency of corrupt transactions is inversely related to income levels. When the government increases the fraction of profits that it extracts from entrepreneurs, intermediation intensifies, as entrepreneurs are reluctant to obtain licenses through legal means. Therefore, when business costs are high, measures to combat corruption transfer value to intermediaries. Increasing the frequency of governments audits can increase the equilibrium price of permits.