The Economics of Counterfeiting
构建了一个多市场博弈模型，分析伪造者选择伪造面额和质量、验证者选择验证努力时的均衡，发现高面额货币伪造质量更高但验证也更严格，预测与特勤局数据一致。
We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross-sectional patterns in a unique data set assembled largely from the Secret Service.