Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
研究了在非拟线性偏好（支付影响物品使用或收益）下，最低价格瓦尔拉斯规则是唯一同时满足防策略性、效率、个体理性和不补贴失败者的分配规则，为政府常用的同步升价拍卖提供了理论支持。
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The ``minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule'' is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \\textit{strategy-proofness}, \\textit{efficiency}, \\textit{individual rationality}, and \\textit{no subsidy for losers}. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.