The Impact of Manufacturer’s Direct Sales and Cost Information Asymmetry in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer
研究了制造商在双渠道中直销且生产成本为私有信息时，风险规避零售商如何设计最优合同，发现制造商直销能带来比信息不对称更大的利润。
With the development of electronic commerce, more and more manufacturers choose to distribute their products not only through retail channels but also directly to customers through online channels. This phenomenon is called manufacturer encroachment. We investigate the advantages and drawbacks of manufacturer encroachment in a dual-channel supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and stochastic price-dependent demand. By assuming that the manufacturer’s production cost is private, we build a principal–agent model to explore the optimal contracts the retailer will offer and compare four cases based on the information state and distribution strategy of the manufacturer. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of the key parameters on the optimal contracts and profits using numerical experiments. We find that choosing to encroach can bring the manufacturer much greater profit than information asymmetry.