How Do Managers of Non‐Announcing Firms Respond to Intra‐Industry Information Transfers?
研究了非公告公司管理者如何通过披露好消息来应对同行股利变化引发的信息转移，发现行业集中度影响其反应策略，且干预能有效减少负面或增加正面信息转移对股价的影响。
Abstract: I investigate non‐announcing firms’ disclosure patterns in response to information transfers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that non‐announcing managers take steps to shield their firms from their peers’ bad news or to imitate their peers’ good news. However, existing research on information transfers seems to ignore this aspect. Using announcements of dividend changes, I find that non‐announcing managers routinely intervene in the information transfer process by disclosing good news to dispel negative information transfers on their firms’ share prices. More importantly, I find that industry concentration plays a significant role in managers’ reactions. In particular, managers in more‐concentrated industries are more likely to disclose good news following a rival's good news, while managers in less‐concentrated industries are more likely to disclose good news following a rival's bad news. Finally, my results accentuate the role of disclosure by documenting that managers who intervene significantly reduce (increase) negative (positive) information transfers on their firms’ share prices.