Implementation with interdependent valuations
研究了当代理人估值相互依赖时，VCG机制无法实现激励相容的问题，通过微小调整转移支付恢复激励相容，并证明真实报告是近似事后均衡，复制场景下所需总支付趋近于零。
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Lastly, we show that in replicated settings aggregate payments sufficient to induce truthful revelation go to zero.