Information asymmetries and craft guilds in pre‐modern markets: evidence from Italian proto‐industry
利用意大利早期现代的大量质量纠纷数据，分析行会与信息不对称的关系，发现高质量城市纺织业通过私人市场关系和公平制裁有效减少逆向选择，而行会的质量监管反而被既得利益集团操纵，产生负面影响。
This article analyses the relationship between guilds and information asymmetries using a large database of quality disputes from early modern Italy. It finds that a high‐quality urban textile industry was able to solve externalities using a range of ex ante and ex post monitoring mechanisms based on private market relationships and fair sanctions which effectively reduced adverse selection and information asymmetries. Instead, when guilds did use their quality regulations, the effect of the guild on information asymmetries and the industry as a whole was generally negative, by providing mechanisms that could be manipulated by entrenched interest groups for rent‐seeking purposes.