The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market
利用证券借贷市场的独特场景，研究发现机构投资者会限制可借出股票或召回已借出股票以行使投票权，且召回行为与更严格的监督、公司业绩差或治理弱以及治理回报高的提案相关，最终投票时召回导致对管理层支持减少、对股东提案支持增加。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance.