Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa
利用南部非洲关税的准实验变化估计贸易弹性，发现腐败导致关税削减对进口影响微弱，但关税自由化仍能减少贿赂并改善进口申报激励。
This paper exploits quasi-experimental variation in tariffs in southern Africa to estimate trade elasticities. Traded quantities respond only weakly to a 30 percent reduction in the average nominal tariff rate. Trade flow data combined with primary data on firm behavior and bribe payments suggest that corruption is a potential explanation for the observed low elasticities. In contexts of pervasive corruption, even small bribes can significantly reduce tariffs, making tariff liberalization schemes less likely to affect the extensive and the intensive margins of firms' import behavior. The tariff liberalization scheme is, however, still associated with improved incentives to accurately report quantities of imported goods, and with a significant reduction in bribe transfers from importers to public officials.