Electoral Cycles among US Courts of Appeals Judges
研究发现美国上诉法院法官在总统大选前异议率翻倍，且更倾向按党派投票，经验较少或处于极化环境中的法官尤为明显，这质疑了司法中立性。
We find field evidence consistent with experimental studies that document the contexts and characteristics making individuals more susceptible to priming. Just before US presidential elections, judges on the US courts of appeals double the rate at which they dissent and vote along partisan lines. Increases are accentuated for judges with less experience and in polarized environments. During periods of national unity—wartime, for example—judges suppress dissents, especially if they have less experience or are in polarized environments. We show that the dissent rate increases gradually from 6 percent to nearly 12 percent in the quarter before an election and returns immediately to 6 percent after the election. If highly experienced professionals making common-law precedent can be politically primed, it raises questions about the perceived impartiality of the judiciary.