Strategic Revenue Sharing with Daily Deal Sites: A Competitive Analysis
构建理论模型分析企业通过每日团购网站（如Groupon）促销的盈利性，考察消费者类型、议价能力、收入分成协议及市场竞争程度等因素的影响，发现需求溢出时可能出现不对称均衡。
ABSTRACT Promoting through daily deal sites has become popular in the past few years. Groupon is perhaps the best known provider of these promotions (also known as online discount vouchers) to customers. Daily deals differ from traditional coupons on three important dimensions: (i) They are not offered to consumers directly by firms but are offered through an intermediary, (ii) the promotional depth offered by these localized promotions tends to be higher, and (iii) consumers prepay for the discount vouchers, and then the daily deals site reimburses the retailer a prespecified negotiated percentage of each paid voucher. In this study, we build a theoretical model to explore the profitability of undertaking a daily deals campaign by firms. Our analysis identifies the role of types of consumers in the market, relative bargaining power of the local firms, revenue sharing agreements, and market characteristics, such as degree of product substitutability and extent of competition, on the profitability attained through daily deal promotions. Surprisingly, when demand spillovers exist, an asymmetric outcome, with one firm offering an online discount voucher and the competing firm not offering an online discount voucher, is an equilibrium under some conditions.