The citizen‐candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization
修改了公民候选人模型，假设政策由政府和外部势力妥协产生，发现即使参选成本极低，候选人政策距离也有下限，且可能出现非中位选民偏好的唯一候选人，揭示了战略委托的局限性。
Abstract We present a modified citizen‐candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two‐candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one‐candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.