Low Real Interest Rates, Collateral Misrepresentation, and Monetary Policy
构建了一个模型，研究家庭和银行在低实际利率时伪造抵押品质量的激励问题，发现常规货币宽松会加剧这一问题，而央行资产购买若可行则通过绕过次优财政政策发挥作用。
A model is constructed in which households and banks have incentives to fake the quality of collateral. These incentive problems matter when collateral is scarce in the aggregate—when real interest rates are low. Conventional monetary easing can exacerbate these problems, in that the misrepresentation of collateral becomes more profitable, thus increasing haircuts and interest rate differentials. Central bank purchases of private mortgages may not be feasible, due to the misrepresentation of asset quality. If feasible, central bank asset purchase programs work by circumventing suboptimal fiscal policy, not by mitigating incentive problems in asset markets.