Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling
研究发现，在亚利桑那州马里科帕县的自愿餐厅卫生评级中，只有58%的检查结果被在线公布，且高评级A级餐厅比低评级A级餐厅更不愿披露，这可用信号传递与反向信号传递的混合模型解释。
In 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D ). Using inspection results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality A s. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse A s and better B s use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants.