Coordination of a supply chain with loss-averse consumers in service quality
构建两期博弈模型，研究存在服务质量损失厌恶消费者时，全单位数量折扣与服务补贴率如何协调零售商的定价和服务质量决策，并分析损失厌恶程度对协调批发价和供应商议价能力的影响。
We develop a two-period game model to study the coordination mechanism for a supply chain with loss-averse consumers who are assumed to have dwindling sensitivity to service quality gain relative to loss. We find that all-unit quantity discount coupling with service subsidy rate can coordinate the retailer’s price and service quality decisions together in each period. When consumers become more loss-averse in service quality, the coordinated wholesale price in the first period might increase; whereas that in the second period decreases. With Pareto coordination mechanism, larger loss-aversion might weaken the supplier’s bargaining power. We provide managerial insights on how to adjust the coordinated contract when the consumers’ loss-aversion and reference value of service quality level change.