Compulsory Licensing and Patent Protection: A North‐South Perspective
用一个南北模型分析发展中国家（南方）的专利保护政策如何影响强制许可的发生和社会价值，发现若南方必须提供专利保护，强制许可可能实现帕累托改进。
In a stylized model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-holder, we analyze whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's patent protection policy. If South is free to deny patent protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obligated to offer patent protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for patent protection as well as the likelihood of CL. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.