ENDOWMENTS, PERCEIVED SIMILARITY, AND DICTATOR GIVING
研究发现，在独裁者博弈中，参与者对禀赋来源的感知相似性会显著影响其给予金额，相似性越高则给予越少，挑战了货币可替代性的传统假设。
A common assumption of money is that it is fungible. An implication of this assumption is that the source of money does not affect economic decision making. We find evidence contradicting this fungibility assumption. Specifically, we explore how the perception of an endowment source influences amounts sent in a dictator game. We find perceived similarity to the endowment provider to be negatively correlated with dictator offers. Dictators who consider themselves relatively more similar to their endowment provider send significantly smaller amounts to their partners. Our results demonstrate that economic decision making can be influenced by the provider of income shocks.