Insider Ownership and Financial Analysts’ Information Environment: Evidence From Dual-Class Firms
研究美国双重股权公司中内部人持股对分析师预测准确性和分歧度的影响，发现内部人控制权与预测准确性负相关、与预测分歧正相关，而现金流权与投票权的影响相反。
We examine the association of insider ownership with financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion in a sample of U.S. dual-class firms. Insider ownership exerts two effects: a positive incentive effect and a negative entrenchment effect. The lack of significant findings in prior research regarding the association between insider ownership and forecast accuracy may be attributable to the offsetting forces of these two effects. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. firms that maintain more than one class of common stock, we are able to disentangle incentive and entrenchment effects which are confounded in single-class firms. We find that disproportionate insider control is negatively associated with forecast accuracy and positively associated with forecast dispersion. Moreover, insider cash flow rights (insider voting rights) are positively (negatively) associated with forecast accuracy and negatively (positively) associated with forecast dispersion, consistent with incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects of ownership affecting financial analysts’ forecasting environment in opposite directions.