Signals matter? Large retirement responses to limited financial incentives
研究英国女性法定退休年龄提高对就业率的影响，发现尽管财务激励很小，但退休年龄信号本身导致就业率下降6.3个百分点，对理解退休决策机制有参考价值。
Do early retirement ages (ERA) provide a signal about the appropriate age to retire? We examine the impact of increasing the ERA for women in a context (the UK) where the financial incentive to retire at the ERA is very limited. Despite limited financial incentives, we find that women's employment rates at the old ERA increased by 6.3 percentage points. Our results suggest that wealth effects, credit constraints and changes to marginal financial incentives to work do not drive this effect but instead that most of the excess retirements observed at the ERA are driven by a signal to retire.