Opportunistic decision-making in government: concept formation, variety and explanation
本文澄清了政府决策中机会主义的不同含义和程度，提出新概念框架，并用1945-1990年英国内阁决策案例展示新德克海姆制度理论如何解释不同行政体制下机会主义的成因，帮助公共管理者识别风险。
The notion of opportunism is too often used loosely in policy and administrative research on executive decision-making: its various meanings are too rarely clearly distinguished. To make it useful for explanation, this article presents fresh concept formation work, clarifying the concept to recognize different kinds and degrees of opportunism. To illustrate the use of the refined concept, the article examines key decisions by British cabinets and core executives between 1945 and 1990. It proposes that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory can help to explain why different kinds of opportunism are cultivated in differently ordered administrations, so providing new insight into decision-making. Points for practitioners The article provides a framework through which public managers can identify degrees and types of opportunism among the elected politicians they serve. It will help public managers to identify risks associated with such decisions, when they are asked to execute them.