Resource curse avoidance: governmental intervention and wage formation in the Norwegian petroleum sector
研究了挪威石油部门从分散工资谈判转向协调谈判的政府干预，发现该干预成功降低了内部人权重和滞后效应，重新建立了协调工资谈判体系，表明制度在避免资源诅咒中起关键作用。
A likely channel for Dutch disease, turning a presumably blessed resource windfall into a curse, is the wage formation process. By utilizing the shift from decentralized and uncoordinated wage bargaining in the Norwegian petroleum sector to co-ordinated bargaining, this paper analyses the effectiveness of a governmental intervention aimed at preventing the extraordinary petroleum wage inflation to become detrimental to the economy. The empirical analysis shows that the intervention was successful as insider weights and insider hysteresis effects were reduced, and that the system of coordinated wage bargaining was re-established. The principal conclusion is that institutions and institutional settings play a crucial role in avoiding adverse economic development.