Estimating Auctions with Externalities: The Case of USFS Timber Auctions
提出一个拍卖模型，其中输家会受到取决于赢家身份的外部性影响，并利用美国林务局木材拍卖数据估计出这种外部性导致5.2%的拍卖出现资源错配。
Abstract I introduce an empirical auction model where in addition to the private value that each bidder receives upon winning the auction, losing bidders incur a negative externality that depends on the identity of the rival winner. I show how the externalities and private value distributions can be identified and estimated in such a model. I then apply the model to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. I find that mill bidders impose significant externalities on one another of between 10% and 22% of the heterogeneous portion of their valuation. This leads the timber tracts to be misallocated in 5.2% of the auctions in my sample.