Corporate Governance and Capital Structure: A Spanish Study
研究了2005至2011年西班牙上市公司中管理层持股和控股股东持股与资本结构的关系，发现两者呈非线性关系，并讨论了股东监督、少数股东保护等政策含义。
This study explores the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance using a data panel of Spanish listed firms over the period 2005 to 2011. Specifically, two notable conflicts in the area of corporate governance have been analysed: (i) managerial ownership; and (ii) controlling shareholders ownership. Our findings confirm a non‐monotonic relationship between both managerial ownership and ownership concentration, and capital structure. In order to mitigate endogeneity concerns, a number of robustness tests have been performed. The empirical evidence obtained yields a number of implications such as the shareholders' need to monitor entrenched managers, the insufficient protective legislation to prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders and the desirability of examining corporate governance factors in order to better understand a firm's financial policy.