Bankers on the Board and CEO Incentives
研究了商业银行董事是否代表股东利益设计CEO激励，发现关联银行董事降低CEO薪酬的VEGA（风险激励），并增加债务类薪酬、降低其对风险的敏感性。
ABSTRACT The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act demanded the presence of more financial experts on corporate boards to improve governance. Directors from lending banks require particular attention because of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders despite their financial expertise. In this paper, we examine whether commercial banker directors work in the best interests of shareholders in providing incentives to the CEO. We find that the CEO's compensation VEGA is lower if an affiliated banker director is on the board. Further, we find that commercial banker directors increase debt‐like compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) and make it less sensitive to risk.