Monopsony Power in Migrant Labor Markets: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates
利用阿联酋放松雇主变更限制的改革，研究发现改革提高了在职移民的工资和留职率，但降低了对新移民的需求和工资，揭示了企业对移民的买方垄断力量。
By exploiting a reform in the United Arab Emirates that relaxed restrictions on employer transitions, we provide new estimates of the monopsony power of firms over migrant workers. Our results show that the reform increased incumbent migrants' earnings and firm retention. This occurs despite an increase in employer transitions and is driven by a fall in country exits. While the outcomes of incumbents improved, the reform decreased demand for new migrants and lowered their earnings. These results are consistent with a model of monopsony in which firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves for both new recruits in source countries and incumbent migrants.