Multidimensional private information, market structure, and insurance markets
研究了多维私人信息（风险与风险偏好）在不同市场结构下是否会导致保险覆盖与实际风险发生之间的负相关关系，发现完全竞争下需高附加因子才出现负相关，而垄断下在风险与偏好负相关足够强时可能产生。
Abstract We investigate whether selection based on multidimensional private information in risks and risk preferences can, under different market structures, result in a negative correlation between insurance coverage and ex post realization of risk. We show that, under perfect competition, selection based on multidimensional private information does not result in the negative correlation property, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. However, it is possible to generate the negative correlation property under monopoly when risk and risk preference types are sufficiently negative dependent. We also clarify the connections between important concepts such as adverse/advantageous selection and positive/negative correlation property.