Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts
研究了长期基础服务在后续需要不确定附加服务时的最优动态合同，发现企业风险厌恶通过收入效应和风险效应影响合同设计，对扭曲动态、合同重谈和不完全合同价值有重要启示。
We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts.