Generalized Stability of Monetary Unions Under Regime Switching in Monetary and Fiscal Policies
研究发现，若财政当局承诺未来转向更可持续的财政体制，则暂时偏离通胀目标制的严格预算要求是可行的，从而扩大货币联盟的稳定政策空间。
Abstract Earlier studies on the stability of monetary unions show that an inflation‐targeting central bank imposes strict budgetary requirements on fiscal policy to obtain a unique stable equilibrium. Failure of only one fiscal authority to meet these requirements already results in nonexistence of equilibrium. Nevertheless, it might prove useful to temporarily depart from such requirements in order to absorb country‐specific shocks. We show that such departures are feasible if fiscal authorities commit to switch to more sustainable fiscal regimes in the future. Debt devaluation and fiscal bailouts may also broaden the range of policy stances under which monetary unions are stable.