The Association between Board Composition and Corporate Pension Policies
研究了董事会构成如何影响企业养老金政策，发现外部董事比例越高，养老金计划资金水平越高，且在财务困境风险高时，外部董事多的公司会减少养老金资产中高风险证券的配置。
Abstract This study examines the role of board composition in the determination of pension policies. The results suggest that the proportion of outside directors serving on the board is positively related with pension plan funding levels. In addition, the proportion of outside directors mitigates the relation between financial distress risk and plan underfunding. Last, as firms approach distress, boards with a greater proportion of outside directors tend to allocate a lower fraction of plan assets to riskier securities. Together, our findings suggest that outside directors are mindful of their obligations toward pension plan beneficiaries.