The Market for Conflicted Advice
研究了顾问存在利益冲突时，通过信息提供竞争异质客户的市场均衡，发现冲突费用不影响客户福利，而金融素养教育可通过溢出效应提升所有客户福利。
ABSTRACT We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. Although conflicted fees lead to distorted information, they are irrelevant for customers' welfare: banning conflicted fees improves only the information quality, not customers' welfare. Instead, financial literacy education for the least informed customers can improve all customers' welfare because of a spillover effect. Furthermore, customers who trade through advisers realize lower average returns, which rationalizes empirical findings.