CEO Incentives, Relationship Lending, and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
研究贷款关系如何缓解CEO薪酬合同引发的股东与债权人利益冲突，发现贷款关系能降低CEO风险激励对贷款利差的影响，尤其对信息不透明企业更显著。
We investigate how lending relationships attenuate the conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders that arises from chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts. We find that lending relationships mitigate the influence of CEO risk‐taking incentives on loan spreads, especially for informationally opaque firms. In addition, lending relationships attenuate the impact of CEO risk‐taking incentives on maturity and collateral requirements. This article highlights the importance of bank monitoring through lending relationships to mitigate managerial risk‐shifting activities that arise from equity incentives.