Political Economy of Redistribution in the United States in the Aftermath of World War II—Evidence and Theory
通过立法、历史和统计证据，发现二战导致美国转移支付和税收大幅永久性上升，并用一个政治经济学框架解释：战争提高了现状税负和税收技术，增强了中位选民在国防开支减少后的议价能力，从而永久提高了再分配水平。
We present legislative, historical and statistical evidence of a substantial upward ratchet in transfers and taxes in the US due to World War II. This finding is explained within a political-economy framework with defense spending responding to a war threat and a median voter in the population who interacts with a (richer) agenda setter in Congress in setting redistribution. While the setter managed to cap redistribution before the War, the War itself raised the status quo tax burden and improved tax collection technology, strengthening the bargaining power of the median voter as defense spending receded. This permanently raised the level of redistribution.