MANAGING RISK TAKING WITH INTEREST RATE POLICY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS
建立模型分析金融中介因有限责任和存款保险而过度承担风险的问题，并研究利率政策与宏观审慎监管（如资本监管、杠杆监管和利润税）如何组合以实现有效风险承担。
We develop a model in which a financial intermediary's investment in risky assets— risk taking —is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance, and characterize the policies that implement efficient risk taking. In the calibrated model, combining interest rate policy with state‐contingent macroprudential regulations—either capital or leverage regulation, and a tax on profits—achieves efficiency. Interest rate policy mitigates excessive risk taking by altering the return and the supply of collateralizable safe assets. In contrast to commonly used capital regulation, leverage regulation has stronger effects on risk taking and calls for higher interest rates.