Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions
利用美国各州劳动保护法通过作为外生冲击，研究发现解雇成本上升导致企业降低债务比率，经营杠杆和盈利波动性增加，就业刚性增强，表明解雇成本通过提高财务困境成本挤出了财务杠杆。
ABSTRACT I exploit the adoption of state‐level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.